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EVIDENCE-PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT OF A
NON-PARTY WITNESS-The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has rejected the long established,
orthodox rule and embraced the modern rule which
allows, as substantive evidence, the prior inconsistent
statements of a non-party witness available for cross-
examination.
Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986).
In the early morning hours of September 14, 1980, Anthony Brady
and his girlfriend, Tina Traxler, scaled the fence surrounding the
Wilson Manufacturing plant and entered the building through a side
door.' Once inside the building, Traxler remained in the hallway
while Brady entered the company's lunchroom to pry open a dollar
change machine. 2 At this time, George Hoffman, the plant security
guard, confronted Traxler and grabbed her by the arm.3 Brady
returned from the lunchroom and a scuffle ensued between himself
and the guard during which the guard was stabbed.
4
The next day, Traxler appeared on her own initiative at the police
station and voluntarily gave the police a statement which implicated
Brady in the crimes. 5 Traxler's account of the events of that day
1. Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986). Superior
Court decision can be found at 338 Pa. Super. 137, 487 A.2d 891 (1985). Brady,
507 A.2d at 67. Appellee awakened Traxler at her home in Sunbury, Pennsylvania
and persuaded her to take a ride with him. While driving near the area know as
the Shale Pit, appellee ran the car into a ditch. Unable to extricate the car from
the ditch, appellee and Traxler decided to walk home. It was at this time that they
encountered the Wilson Manufacturing plant. Id. at 67.
2. Brady, 487 A.2d at 892.
3. Id. at 892.
4. Id.
5. Id. In the Supreme Court's opinion by Justice Larsen, the facts surround-
ing Traxler's statement are recounted differently. The opinion states that Traxler
initially talked to the police later in the afternoon on September 14, 1980. Brady,
507 A.2d at 70. Traxler told police that she and Brady had walked by the Wilson
Manufacturing plant without entering. Id. at 70. She voluntarily rode out to the
plant with the police and admitted that they had entered the plant and that Brady
had stabbed the security guard. Id. at 70.
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were tape-recorded by the police.6 Prior to trial, however, Traxler
recanted her taped statement and filed an affidavit denying that she
and Brady had entered the Wilson plant.
7
At trial, Traxler was called as a witness by the Commonwealth
where she denied that she and Brady ever entered the plant. 8 The
court ruled that Traxler was a hostile witness and permitted the
Commonwealth, over the objection of defense counsel, to cross-
examine her on the prior inconsistent tape-recorded statement.9 The
court also allowed the Commonwealth to introduce the entire tape-
recorded statement as substantive evidence.10
Despite Traxler's inconsistent statements, a jury found Brady guilty
of second degree murder, burglary, and criminal mischief." The
Superior Court reversed and remanded for a new trial holding that
it was error to introduce as substantive evidence prior inconsistent
statements uttered by a non-party witness.1 2 Following that decision,
the Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal and was
granted allocatur by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
3
6. Brady, 507 A.2d at 70. Traxler's statement was recorded by the police
in the presence of Traxler's mother and attorney. Id. Prior to making this statement,
Traxler was questioned by her attorney to assure that the statement was being given
knowingly, voluntarily and with an understanding of her rights. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 70-71. During cross-examination by the Commonwealth, Traxler
admitted that her statement to the police was given voluntarily. Id. at 71.
10. Id. at 71. On cross-examination, defense counsel tried to discredit the
tape-recorded statement by showing that Traxler had been afraid of the police and
that they had asked her leading questions. Id. Traxler testified that she simply told
the police what they wished to hear instead of the truth. Id.
11. Id. at 67. Post-verdict motions were denied, and Brady was sentenced to
a term of life imprisonment on the second-degree murder conviction, a consecutive
term of imprisonment of from five to ten years on the burglary conviction and a
concurrent term of six months to one year on the criminal mischief conviction. Id.
at 67. Brady then submitted forty-two (42) issues for review on appeal to the
Superior Court, Philadelphia. The Superior Court, however, found it necessary to
address only two. Id. at 67-68. In its analysis of the second issue, the Supreme
Court held that the element of surprise is not an absolute requirement in allowing
a party to impeach its own witness. Id. at 72. This rule allows the parties to reveal
the truth without regard to strict technicalities. Id. at 72.
12. Brady, 487 A.2d at 892. The Superior Court held that absent these
inconsistent statements, the uncontradicted evidence of defendant's guilt was insuf-
ficient to uphold the conviction. Id. at 893. The evidence included the fact that
Brady was seen carrying a knife on the night of the murder; the blood types on
Brady's shirt matched those found on the victim's clothes; and blood of Brady's
type was found on the decedent's clothes. Id. at 893.
13. Brady, 507 A.2d at 67. The Commonwealth's Petition for Allowance of
Appeal was granted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at No. 72 E.D. Appeal
Docket 1985. Brady, 507 A.2d at 66.
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RECENT DECISION
Justice Larsen, writing for the majority 4 of the court, noted that
the traditional rule concerning prior inconsistent statements has been
the object of a great deal of criticism by the members of the court.
15
The majority indicated that in Commonwealth v. Gee,'6 a plurality
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the rule allowing
prior inconsistent statements only to impeach the credibility of the
witness has been strongly criticized as being both unrealistic and an
inappropriate application of the hearsay rule. 17 The court recognized
that the witness is available at trial for cross-examination and,
therefore, the dangers that the hearsay rule was adopted to prevent
are alleviated.' 8 The majority also noted that in Commonwealth v.
Loar, 9 the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that the tradi-
tional rule should be re-examined and discarded in favor of the
modern rule allowing prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence. 20
The Brady court believed that the dangers of hearsay were largely
non-existent where the witness testifies at trial.2' The majority stated
that the availability of cross-examination provided the fact-finder
with ample opportunity to determine the truth of the statements, as
well as the ability to observe the witness. Additionally, the court
14. The other members of the majority were Justices Hutchinson, McDermott
and Papadakos.
15. Prior to Brady, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adhered to the
orthodox rule which limits the use of such prior inconsistent statements of a non-
party witness to impeachment. Id. at 68. Previously, only inconsistent statements of
a party were admissible as substantive evidence. Id. at 68 note 4. The decision in
Brady, however, effectively overrules prior decisions of this court and allows prior
inconsistent statements made by a non- party witness available for cross-examination
to be introduced as substantive evidence. Id. at 68. Effectively overruling Common-
wealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 307 A.2d 245 (1973); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467
Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976); and Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 444 A.2d
653 (1982).
16. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976).
17. Gee, 467 Pa. at 136 n.5, 354 A.2d at 880 note 5.
18. Brady, 507 A.2d at 69.
19. Loar, 264 Pa. Super. 398, 399 A.2d 1110 (1979) (Roberts, J., joined by
Manderino, J., dissenting).
20. Loar, 264 Pa. Super. at 411, 399 A.2d at 1117.
21. Brady, 507 A.2d at 69 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155
(1970)).
22. Brady, 507 A.2d at 69. As stated by the Honorable Learned Hand in
DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925), "If, from all that the
jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but
what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear
of that person and in court." Brady, 507 A.2d at 69.
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stated that the prior statement is more reliable when given at a point
in time closer to the event described when memory is more precise
and the opportunity for fabrication is lessened.
23
In concluding, the court noted that the foregoing criticisms have
persuaded a large number of jurisdictions to discard the traditional
view. 24 The majority determined that the orthodox rule served only
to keep relevant and reliable evidence from the jury.Y
Chief Justice Nix, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the
majority that prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness
should be admissible as substantive evidence, but wrote separately to
express his concern over the fact that the trial court ignored con-
trolling precedent in reaching its decision. 26 Nix stated that the
Commonwealth's pre-trial application to admit the prior inconsistent
statement should have been denied. This interlocutory order could
then be appealed to an appellate court before the beginning of the
trial, thereby preventing such a blatant disregard of binding prece-
dent. 27
Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Zappala, dissented from the
holding in Brady.28 Flaherty noted that it is the Commonwealth's
obligation to prove every element of the crime while in court. 29 The
dissent argued that if the Commonwealth is unable to present suf-
ficient evidence of guilt at trial, the case against the defendant should
fail.3 0 The prior statements may not be sufficiently or adequately
presented or explained in the presence of the trier of fact to support
a verdict of guilty.3
1
23. Brady, 507 A.2d at 69 (citing McCormick, Evidence §251 (2d ed.).
24. Brady, 507 A.2d at 69-70.(citations omitted). See, e.g., People v. Freeman,
20 Cal. App. 3d 488, 97 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1971); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286
S.E.2d 717 (1982); Vogel v. State, 96 Wis.2d 372, 291 N.W.2d 838 (1980); State v.
Provet, 133 N.J. Super. 432, 337 A.2d 374 (1975); State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz. 135,
515 P.2d 880 (1973); Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1982); State
v. Lott, 207 Kan. 602, 485 P.2d 1314 (1971); and Smith v. State, 400 N.E.2d 1137
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
25. Brady, 507 A.2d at 70. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gee, supra, 467 Pa.
at 146, 354 A.2d at 886 (Roberts J.,dissenting)). Roberts concluded that "an
evidentiary rule which forces the searcher to ignore relevant clues whose reliability
can be tested by cross-examination serves no purpose." Id. at 70.
26. Brady, 507 A.2d at 72.
27. Id. at 72-73.
28. Id. at 73. Justice Flaherty reasoned that the orthodox rule may in fact
be "antiquated," but maintained that "many of the hard-wrought concepts which
enhance our traditional definition of due process" are likewise. Id. at 73.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Flaherty stated that uncertainty arises as to the trustworthiness and
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RECENT DECISION
Prior to the court's decision in Brady, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania had adhered to the common law rule that prior incon-
sistent statements of a non-party witness were admissible only to
impeach the witness' credibility.32 Such statements were limited to
impeachment and were not admissible as substantive evidence. 33 As
early as 1822, in Stahle v. Spohn,34 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
determined that a witness' inconsistent declarations were admissible
as evidence in order to impeach the witness' credibility.35 This case
involved an action of ejectment which was initiated by the defendant
in error in order to recover a house and lot of ground which he had
purchased at a sheriff's sale as the property of plaintiff in error's
son. 36 At trial, the plaintiff in error testified in a manner inconsistent
with statements which he had previously made concerning the sale
of land.3 7 When confronted with the admissibility of these statements,
the court found that the evidence was admissible in order to show
that the witness made contradictory statements at other times and
places. 38 However, the ability to impeach the witness was limited to
value of the prior statements as substantive evidence. Id. at 73. In concluding, the
dissent believed that "the rule announced by the majority works to 'bootstrap' the
guilt of the accused." Id. at 73.
32. Id. Upon consideration of the shortcomings of the orthodox rule which
ignores the fact that the oath and cross-examination requirements are supplied in
the current trial thereby providing the trier of fact with ample opportunity to observe
the witness' demeanor, the Supreme Court rejected that rule and embraced the
modern rule as the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. at 68-69.
Pennsylvania's adherence to. the orthodox rule has its origins in common law. See,
McAteer v. McMullin, 2 Pa. 32, 33 (1845); see also Wertz v. May, 21 Pa. 274, 279
(1853). "It is always competent for a party to show that a witness, called to testify
against him, has related the facts to which he testifies differently on former occasions,
whether under oath or not." Wertz, 21 Pa. at 279; see generally, Henry, Pennsylvania
Evidence §801 (1953).
33. Brady, 507 A.2d at 68. See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 307
A.2d 245 (1973); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 444 A.2d 653 (1982).
34. Stahle v. Spohn, 8 Serg. & Rawle 317 (1822).
35. Id. at 325. In its analysis, the court specified that a witness may be
discredited by showing that, in his examination, he did not tell the whole truth. Id.
at 325.
36. Id. at 318. William Spohn, the defendant in error, brought an action of
ejectment in the District Court of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, against the
plaintiff in error, Jacob Stahle. Id. at 318.
37. Id. at 319.
38. Id. at 325. The court concluded that to impeach the credit of a witness,
evidence was admissible to prove that at different times the witness had made
statements inconsistent with what he swore. Id. at 325.
1987]
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the party against which the witness was called to testify.39 Thus, in
Smith v. Price40 the defendant in error, having called plaintiff's son
as a witness, was denied the opportunity to impeach his witness as
the court declared that a party who produces a witness thereby holds
him out as being worthy of belief and will not be permitted to
impeach his general character by disclosing contradictory statements
made by him on other occasions. 41
Subsequently, the court relaxed this restriction in the case of Bank
of Northern Liberties v. Davis.42 In an action of assumpsit for money
had and received, the Davis court concluded that it is within the
sound discretion of the trial judge to allow a party calling a witness
to prove that the witness had made inconsistent statements at different
times and in the presence of others.43 Likewise, in Commonwealth
v. Delfino,44 the prosecution was permitted to cross-examine its own
witness as to inconsistencies in such witness' testimony. 45 The witness
had previously told the district attorney that the defendant and
deceased were in his hotel early on the evening of the murder and
that the defendant had left first."6 However, at trial, the witness took
the stand and testified that it was the deceased who had left the
hotel first. 47 The trial court determined that it was within its sound
discretion to permit the prosecutor to cross-examine his own witness .
39. Wertz v. May, 21 Pa. at 279; Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 Serg. & Rawle
281 (1825). The general rule was that a party who produced a witness held him out
as being credible and was therefore prohibited from impeaching the witness' general
character. 12 Serg. & Rawle at 283. The party calling the witness was prevented
from introducing contradictory statements made by the witness on previous occa-
sions. Id.
40. Smith v. Price, 8 Watts 447 (1839).
41. Id. at 448. The court determined that a party calling a witness was not
entitled to contradict his testimony by introducing prior inconsistent statements
"ostensibly to discredit him, but, in truth, to operate as independent evidence." Id.
at 448.
42. Bank of Northern Liberties v. Davis, 6 Watts & Serg. 285 (1843).
43. Id. at 288. In Davis, the plaintiff called a bank cashier to the stand who
testified to the genuineness of certain checks purporting to have been drawn by the
plaintiff. Id. at 286. Subsequently, the plaintiff asked the witness whether he had
previously given different testimony. Id. at 286. In overruling defendant's objection,
the court allowed the prior inconsistent statements as the witness was found to be
unwilling and hostile. Id. at 286.
44. Commonwealth v. Delfino, 259 Pa. 272, 102 A. 949 (1918).
45. Id. at 277, 102 A. at 951.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Commonwealth alleged surprise and was permitted to impeach
the witness' credibility by introducing his prior inconsistent statements to the District
Attorney through cross-examination. Id. at 277, 102 A. at 951.
48. Id. Allowing the district attorney to cross-examine his own witness was
not error as that matter is largely within the discretion of the trial judge. Id.
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RECENT DECISION
These early cases limited the admissibility of inconsistencies to im-
peachment, and such statements were not to be considered as sub-
stantive evidence.
49
Several years later in Miller v. Stem,50 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was confronted with the question of whether evidence of a
witness' prior inconsistent statements should be excluded altogether.-'
In Miller, the plaintiff alleged that the court was remiss in failing to
instruct the jury to completely discredit the evidence of the witness. 2
The lower court allowed the inconsistent statements to be introduced
to impeach the witness.53 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, affirming the lower court, concluded that there is no rule
which demands the entire discrediting of a witness who contradicts
himself.5 4
At the close of the nineteenth century, the court was once again
faced with the question as to the weight to be afforded a witness'
prior inconsistent statement.55 In Dampman v. Pennsylvania R.R.
Co.,5 6 the plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's train.57 As
the train approached the railroad station, the coach in which the
plaintiff was riding was derailed and detached from the rest of the
train as a result of a broken rail.5 8 Immediately after the accident,
the railroad's foreman stated to those present at the scene of the
accident that he had previously notified the railroad company that
the rail was defective.5 9 On cross examination, the foreman testified
that he never made such statements 0 Over defendant's objection,
49. Bank of Northern Liberties, 6 Watts & Serg. at 288. A witness' prior
inconsistent statements were permitted solely to neutralize the testimony given at
trial and were not considered as substantive evidence. Id. at 288.
50. Miller v. Stem, 12 Pa. 383 (1849).
51. Id. at 389.
52. Id. The plaintiff stated that because of contradictions and discrepancies
which arose between his former testimony and that given at the present trial, the
witness' entire testimony should have been disallowed. Id. at 389.
53. Id. The court declared that the credit due a witness is a subject for the
jury. Id.
54. Id. "There is no rule which dictates the entire discredit of a witness who
varies in his statements, unless the contradiction be satisfactorily explained by
himself." Id.
55. Commonwealth v. Wertz, 161 Pa. 591, 29 A. 272 (1894); Dampman v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 520, 31 A. 244 (1895).
56. Dampman, 166 Pa. 520, 31 A. 244 (1895).
57. Id. at 520, 31 A. at 244.
58. Id. at 520, 31 A. at 245.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 521, 31 A. at 244.
1987]
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the plaintiff was permitted to discredit the foreman's testimony by
calling witnesses who testified that the foreman did in fact tell them
that he had notified the railroad about the faulty rail condition. 61 In
upholding the common law rule, the Supreme Court determined that
a witness' prior inconsistent statements were admissible as long as
the evidence was restricted to the question of credibility. 62
During the first half of the twentieth century, the orthodox rule,
limiting the use of a witness' prior inconsistent statements to im-
peachment, remained virtually unchanged in Pennsylvania. 6 In fact,
the only substantial change which occurred in the law was the decision
that mandated giving limited jury instructions relating to the evi-
dence's admissibility in order to prevent prejudicial error. 64
61. Id.
62. Id. at 522, 31 A. at 244. "Declarations by (a) state's witness, made
immediately after the occurrence, entirely inconsistent with his testimony, are ad-
missible to impeach him." Id. at 520, 31 A. at 244. See also Wertz, supra 161 Pa.
at 597, 29 A. at 273.
63. In Scheer v. Melville, 279 Pa. 401, 123 A. 853 (1924), the defendant
offered inconsistent written statements previously made by the plaintiff's witnesses.
These statements were introduced for the sole purpose of contradicting that the
witness' trial testimony. Id. at 405, 123 A. at 854. In the trial judge's instructions
to the jury, he informed them that the prior written statements were to be considered
only to discredit the witness' testimony. Id. In these instructions, Judge Simpson
stated, "If you disregard those witnesses by reason of the introduction of those
papers, you will disregard their testimony in your minds, but you will not substitute
the statements in the signed papers as evidence, because that is not the way things
are proved in a judicial trial." Id.
In Commonwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Super. 165, 50 A.2d 742 (1947), the court
adhered to the traditional rule in finding that a witness' prior inconsistent statements
were inadmissible for the purpose of establishing the truth of the facts asserted. Id.
at 172, 50 A.2d at 745. Further, the court found that such statements were competent
for the sole purpose of discrediting the witness, and upon request, the statements'
admissibility would be limited to that purpose. Id.
In 1948, however, the court determined that these limiting jury instructions
were not a matter within the trial court's discretion. Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa. Super.
430, 62 A.2d 75 (1948). Throughout the court's analysis, the necessity of these
limiting instructions became apparent. The court held that it was prejudicial error
for a judge to fail to instruct the jury that inconsistent statements were admissible
only to impeach the witness and such statements were not to be considered as
substantive evidence. Id. at 433, 62 A.2d at 77.
64. See Herr v. Erb, supra note 63 and accompanying text. Accord, Com-
monwealth v. DiPasquale, 424 Pa. 500, 230 A.2d 449 (1967), wherein the court
found that trial error results even in the absence of a specific request for a charge
that the prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible only on the issue
of credibility. Id. at 503, 230 A.2d at 451. In Commonwealth v. Commander, 436
Pa. 532, 260 A.2d 773 (1970), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was urged to change
the long-established rule in favor of a more modern rule which would allow a
witness' prior inconsistent statements to be introduced as substantive evidence. Id.
[Vol. 26:121
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In Commonwealth v. Tucker 6 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was once again confronted with the applicability of the orthodox
rule. In Tucker, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was permitted
to cross-examine its own witness as to inconsistent statements which
he allegedly made at a previous trial. 6 The defense attorney did not
object to the allowance of the right to cross-examine, but he objected
to the scope of the cross-examination. 67 The court determined that
the prosecutor exceeded the permissible limits of cross-examination
by eliciting facts that were irrelevant to demonstrate that the witness'
testimony was inconsistent. 68 Justice Nix, writing for the majority,
concluded that the introduction of these facts would prejudice the
defendant because of the danger that the prior statements would be
considered as substantive evidence by the jury. 69
By 1976, the orthodox rule began to receive heavy criticism.70 In
fact, the rule barring the use of prior inconsistent statements as
at 541, 260 A.2d at 778. Though the Supreme Court declined to consider the
question on appeal, as the appellant failed to raise the issue in the lower court, a
footnote was dropped whereby Chief Justice Bell discussed the issue on its merits.
Speaking for himself, Chief Justice Bell found "no persuasive reason to change the
long and well established (by over a dozen cases) law of Pennsylvania concerning
prior inconsistent statements which we have recently reiterated." (citations omitted)
Id. at 542, 260 A.2d at 778 note 3.
65. Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 307 A.2d 245 (1973).
66. Tucker, 452 Pa. at 587, 307 A.2d at 246. The Commonwealth's witness,
Cornell Berry, was initially arrested and charged along with Tucker for the com-
mission of murder. During his trial, Berry placed the entire responsibility for the
crime on Tucker. Id. at 587, 307 A.2d at 246. Following his acquittal, Berry was
called by the Commonwealth as a witness at Tucker's trial. The Commonwealth
anticipated that Berry's testimony would conform to statements which he made at
his own trial, however, Berry testified inconsistently. Id. at 588, 307 A.2d at 247.
67. Id. at 589, 307 A.2d at 248. The Commonwealth attempted to introduce
Berry's trial testimony as well as his version of the event which placed the blame
on appellant. Id.
68. Id. at 590, 307 A.2d at 248. The Commonwealth was found to have
exceeded the permissible scope of cross-examination by eliciting additional facts to
which Berry had not testified at the present trial. Id.
69. Id. Though the court recognized and upheld the orthodox rule, Justice
Nix recognized that several commentators and jurisdictions permitted the use of
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. Id. at 590, 307 A.2d at 248.
The jurisdictions which adopted the modern approach found that because the witness
is presently available for cross-examination, the rule would not violate the confron-
tation clause of the sixth amendment. (citing California v. Green, supra 399 U.S.
149, 154-55.) Tucker, 452 Pa. at 590 note 2, 307 A.2d at 248 n.2. Justice Nix,
however, failed to adopt the modern approach. "Pennsylvania continues to adhere
to the majority rule that such statements are not to be used as substantive evidence."
Id.
70. See DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925);. California v.
1987]
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substantive evidence was seriously questioned by four justices of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Gee.7 1 In writing
for the plurality,72 Justice Eagen upheld the validity of the orthodox
rule but recognized that it had been strongly criticized as being an
unrealistic and inappropriate application of the hearsay rule.7 3 Justice
Roberts, writing for the dissent, urged the abandonment of the
orthodox rule and advocated the allowance of prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence. 74 Justice Roberts recognized that
numerous jurisdictions had already adopted the modern rule and
believed that Pennsylvania should follow their line of reasoning and
discard the antiquated orthodox rule.75 Roberts contended that the
inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the witness'
present testimony as it was made closer in time to the event in
question.7 6 Additionally, the witness is presently subject to cross-
examination which enables the jury to observe the witness' demeanor
and credibility. 77
Green, 399 U.S. 149, (1970); Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609
(1969). But see, State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939). See generally
McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence,
25 Texas L. Rev. 573, 575 (1947) (the orthodox doctrine is highly inconvenient, if
not poisonous to the interests of a party who has had the misfortune of having his
crucial witness intimidated into changing his story); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and
the Application of the Hearsay Doctrine, 26 Hastings L.J. 361, 365 (1974) (because
the witness is available at the present hearing for cross-examination with respect to
both his present and former statements, the whole purpose of the hearsay rule is
satisfied).
71. Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976).
72. The plurality consisted of Justices Eagen and O'Brien. Justices Pomeroy
and Nix concurred in the result while Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Manderino joined. Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
73. Gee 467 Pa. at 136 note 5, 354 A.2d at 880 note 5.
74. Id. at 143, 354 A.2d at 884 (Roberts, J., dissenting joined by Manderino,
J.).
75. Id. at 145, 354 A.2d at 885. In support of his position, Justice Roberts
lists numerous jurisdictions which allow the introduction of a witness' prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 607, 801(d)(1)(A);
Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
929, (1970); Cal. Evid. Code §1235; Kan Stat. Ann.§ 60-460(a); N.J. R. Evid. 63
(1); Utah R. Evid. 63(1); Uniform R. Evid. 801(d)(1). Gee, 467 Pa. at 145, 354
A.2d at 885.
76. Id. at 144, 354 A.2d at 885.
77. Id. Because the witness is present and subject to cross-examination, there
is ample opportunity to test him as to his former statement. "The whole purpose
of the hearsay rule has been already satisfied." Id. at 145 note 3, 354 A.2d at 885
note 3 (citing 3A Wigmore, Evidence, §1018 at 996 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)).
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The criticism expressed in Gee led the Pennsylvania Superior Court
to re-examine and discard the existing Pennsylvania rule in favor of
the modern rule allowing the use of prior inconsistent statements of
a non-party witness as substantive evidence.78 In Commonwealth v.
Loar,79 the defendant and co-defendant were arrested for their in-
volvement in various thefts.8 0 At the preliminary hearing, the co-
defendant was called as a witness by the Commonwealth because he
had previously given a statement inculpating the defendant. 8' The co-
defendant, however, proceeded to deny that the defendant was in-
volved.8 2 The Commonwealth was then permitted to have the co-
defendant read aloud from his prior statement.83 Over the objection
of defense counsel, the magistrate allowed the prior statement to be
introduced as substantive evidence. 84 On appeal to the Superior Court,
Judge Spaeth found that where the witness is in court and subject
to cross-examination, the witness' prior inconsistent statement should
be admissible as substantive evidence, regardless of whether such
statement was sworn or unsworn.8 5
The decision in Loar, however, was subsequently disapproved by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Waller.16 In
Waller, the Commonwealth called a witness .with the expectation that
he would reiterate his prior testimony given at a coroner's inquest.87
78. Commonwealth v. Loar, 264 Pa. Super. 398, 399 A.2d 1110 (1979).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 402, 399 A.2d at 1112.
81. Id. at 406, 399 A.2d at 1114.
82. Id. The Commonwealth also presented evidence proving Ostrander's
involvement in the thefts and the presence of stolen goods in defendant's house.
Id.
83. Id. at 406-07, 399 A.2d at 1114-15.
84. Id. Defendant's counsel sought to limit the use of the statement for
impeachment. Id. at 407, 399 A.2d at 1115.
85. Id. at 412, 399 A.2d at 1117. In concluding, the court stated, "An
evidentiary rule which forces the searcher to ignore relevant clues whose reliability
can be tested by cross-examination serves no purpose." Id. at 413, 399 A.2d at
1118 (citing Justice Roberts' dissent in Gee, 467 Pa. at 146, 354 A.2d at 886).
86. Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 39 note 2, 444 A.2d 653, 656 note
2 (1982). Waller also recognized the criteria set forth in Commonwealth v. Thomas,
459 Pa. 371, 379-80, 329 A.2d 277, 281 (1974), which must be complied with in
order for a party to be allowed to cross-examine his own witness. First, the testimony
of the witness must be unexpected. Second, the witness' testimony must be at
variance with statements made at a previous time. Third, the testimony must be
injurious to the party calling the witness and beneficial to the opposing party.
Fourth, the scope of the cross-examination may not be excessive. Waller, 498 Pa.
at 38-39, 444 A.2d at 655-56.
87. Id. at 40, 444 A.2d at 657.
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Specifically, the Commonwealth expected the witness to testify that
while enroute to the hospital, the defendant, who had a gun in his
possession, pointed out his assailant to the witness and shots were
exchanged.8 At trial, however, the witness testified that he had
neither heard any shots nor had he seen the defendant with a gun
in his hand. 9 Over objection of defense counsel, the prosecution was
permitted to cross-examine the witness as to his prior inconsistent
testimony. 90 In determining the admissibility of the witness' previous
testimony, the court declined to adopt the reasoning in Loar that
prior inconsistent statements may be used as substantive evidence
stating' "such has never been and is not now the law in this
Commonwealth." 91 The court recognized, however, that although the
prior inconsistent statements are limited to impeachment, the re-
sponses to those statements while the witness is on the stand and
subject to cross-examination are substantive evidence. 92
In Commonwealth v. Thirkield,93 the court was once again called
upon to review the issue of the substantive admissibility of prior
statements made by a present testifying witness. In a per curiam
order, 94the court dismissed the appeal as having been improvidently
granted. 95 Urging the abrogation of the traditional rule, Justice
McDermott filed a dissenting opinion in which he proposed adherence
to the modern rule. 96 McDermott noted that "limiting the admissi-
bility of prior inconsistent statements to impeachment ... severely
88. Id. Appellant had been shot several times while sitting in Yancy's car.
Id. at 36, 444 A.2d at 655. While driving appellant to the hospital, Yancey passed
the location where appellant was injured and testified that he saw a man in a white
coat lying on the sidewalk. Id. Yancey also testified that upon arriving at the
hospital, appellant gave him a gun and requested that Yancey give it to the appellant's
brother. Id.
89. Id. at 40, 444 A.2d 657.
90. Id. Thereafter, the appellant was convicted of murder of the third degree,
and he appealed. Id. at 35, 444 A.2d at 654.
91. Id. at 39 note 2, 444 A.2d at 656 note 2.
92. Id. at 38-39, 444 A.2d at 656. If believed by the trier of fact, these
responses may be considered in determining the ultimate question of guilt or
innocence. Cf. Commonwealth v. Crow, 303 Pa. 91, 100, 154 A. 283, 286 (1931);
3A Wigmore, Evidence §1044 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Waller 498 Pa. at 39, 444
A.2d at 656.
93. Commonwealth v. Thirkield, 502 Pa. 542, 467 Pa. 2d 323 (1983) (per
curiam).
94. The per curiam order was issued by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Hutchinson and Zappala. Justice McDermott filed a dissenting
opinion.




impedes the truth-determining process." 97 McDermott concluded by
recognizing that the weight of recent authority is indicative of this
position. 98
In light of the decisions in the previous decade, it seems apparent
that the court's decision in Brady was expected. Criticism of the
orthodox view became more prevalent among legal scholars and
commentators99 as well as among members of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. 100 By 1986, seventeen jurisdictions had either enacted
or modified applicable statutes or rules of evidence in order to permit
the use of prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness for
their substantive value.
101
Additionally, the question as to whether a witness' prior incon-
sistent statements were admissible as substantive evidence, was sub-
jected to a great deal of legislative scrutiny. 02 The Proposed Federal
97. Id. "When a witness is present before the fact-finder, testifies in court,
and is available for cross-examination, no valid purpose is served by barring the
witness' prior statements from use as substantive evidence where such statements
bear sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. at 543, 467 A.2d at 324.
98. Id. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1); Cal. Evid. Code §1235; Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-460(a); 3A Wigmore, Evidence §1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); McCormick,
Evidence §251 (1972). See also the able opinion of now President Judge Spaeth, in
Commonwealth v. Loar, 264 Pa. Super. 398, 399 A.2d 1110 (1979).
99. Brady, 507 A.2d at 68. See e.g., McCormick, Evidence (2d ed.) §251;
3A Wigmore, Evidence, §1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
100. Brady, 507 A.2d at 68. See Commonwealth v. Gee, supra at 467 Pa. 136
n.5, 354 A.2d 875 (plurality opinion of Eagen, J., joined by O'Brien, J.) and at
467 Pa. 143-46, 354 A.2d 875 (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Man-
derino, J.); Commonwealth v. Thirkield, 502 Pa. 542, 467 A.2d 323 (dissenting
opinion of McDermott, J.).
101. Annotation, Use or Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements of
Witness as Substantive Evidence of Facts to Which They Relate in Criminal Case-
Modern State Cases, 30 A.L.R. 4th 414 (1984). "A growing minority of jurisdictions
have departed from the so-called 'orthodox' rule" and have decided, through both
cases and statutes, "to permit the use of prior inconsistent statements of a witness
... for their substantive value, and not merely for impeachment purposes." Id. at
426. Those states which have adopted the modern view include Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana,
New Jersey, New Mexico, South Carolina, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id. at 426-33.
Two additional states, Pennsylvania and Utah, are now among the growing minority
of jurisdictions which have adopted the modern view. See, Brady, 507 A.2d 66;
Utah R. Evid. 613.
102. See generally, Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeach-
ment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments
of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613 and 607, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1565
(1977). In this article, Graham traces the development of the Federal Rules of
Evidence which concern the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence, specifically Rules 801(d)(1)(A), 613 and 607. Additionally, Graham pro-
poses that the Rules be amended in order for them to be more consistently applied
to a witness' prior inconsistent statements.
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Rules of Evidence'0 3 were drafted by the Advisory Committee and
approved by the United States Supreme Court.'0 As drafted, Rule
801(d)(1)(A) provided that all prior statements inconsistent with the
testimony given by a witness during trial were excluded from the
category of hearsay and admissible as substantive evidence. 0 5 When
drafting Rule 801(d)(1)(A), the Advisory Committee specifically stated
that the absence of an oath, cross-examination and observation of
demeanor at the time that the prior statement was made could be
supplied by the later examination at trial. 0 6
Congress' consideration of proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(A) commenced
in the House Committee on the Judiciary. 0 7 The committee's final
version of the rule, which eventually passed the House, required that
in order for the prior inconsistent statement to be admissible as
substantive evidence, the statement must have been given under oath
at a trial, hearing or deposition and subject to cross-examination and
the penalty of perjury.
0 8
After the House adopted its version of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), consid-
eration of the matter moved to the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary. 09 The Senate Committee recommended that the Rule be
103. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183 (1972). For earlier drafts of this proposed rule, see Revised Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D.
315 (1971), and Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
104. 56 F.R.D. at 184.
105. 56 F.R.D. at 293. As drafted by the Advisory Committee and submitted
by the United States Supreme Court, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provided for substantive use
of all prior inconsistent statements:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony...
56 F.R.D. at 293.
106. Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 801, 56 F.R.D. 183, 295
(1972).
107. See H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7075, 7086 (hereinafter, House Report).
108. House Report, supra at 13. The version of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) which passed
the House stated:
... inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to
cross- examination, and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing
or in a deposition ...
House Report, supra at 13.
109. See S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7051, 7062 (hereinafter, Senate Report).
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reinstated as originally proposed by the Advisory Committee, con-
cluding that the requirements of oath and cross-examination were
unnecessary since those elements were present when the witness
testified at trial.110 The Senate accepted the recommendation of its
committee,' 1 and the conflicting House and Senate proposals were
referred to the Conference Committee. The report of the Conference
Committee," 2 incorporating the House version of the Rule, was then
accepted by Congress."'
Many distinguished authorities in the field of evidence have come
to doubt the efficacy of the distinction between admitting the prior
inconsistent statement for its impeachment value only, and admitting
it for its substantive value as well.114 The underlying basis of the
orthodox rule is a lack of trustworthiness of a witness' out-of-court
inconsistent statements.11 5 The supporters of the orthodox rule believe
that such out-of-court statements are hearsay since their value rests
upon the credibility of an out-of-court declarant who, at the time
the statement was made, was not under oath, was not subject to
cross-examination, and was not in the presence of the trier of fact." 6
"Each prong of this threefold rationale has been logically and
thoroughly debunked by scholars and by the growing number of
110. Senate Report, supra at 15-16.
111. Senate Report, supra at 15-16. See also, note 104 and accompanying text.
112. Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7098, 7104.
113. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). As enacted by Congress, Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
reads:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is
(A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
in a deposition...
114. The desirability of the modem rule, allowing as substantive evidence a
prior inconsistent statement of a witness available for cross-examination, has been
thoroughly debated in literature. Graham, supra at 1565, 1568 note 10. See generally
Falknor,The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 43 (1954);
McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence,
25 Texas L. Rev. 573 (1947); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177 (1948); Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent
Statements: Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26 Hastings L.J. 361 (1974); and Silbert,
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 49 Temp. L.Q. 880 (1976).
115. McCormick, supra at §251.
116. 3A Wigmore, supra at §1018.
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jurisdictions."'1 1 7 In California v. Green,"8 the court stated that "the
usual dangers of hearsay are largely non-existent where the witness
testified at trial.""' 9 As stated by Justice McDermott in his dissenting
opinion in Thirkield,20 the fact-finder is provided an ample oppor-
tunity to determine the truth as the requirements of oath and cross-
examination are supplied in the current trial.1
2 '
As expressed in earlier decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
was concerned with the fact that the cross-examination was not
contemporaneous with the out-of-court declaration. 22 As observed in
California v. Green, however, the most successful contemporaneous
cross-examination could hardly expect to accomplish any more than
has already been accomplished by the fact that the witness is now
telling an inconsistent story. 23 The fact that the out-of-court declarant
is now available for cross-examination, assures the trier of fact an
ample opportunity to observe the declarant while questioned as to
117. Brady 507 A.2d at 69 "[A] growing number of jurisdictions have adopted
the modern rule governing prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness by
statute, rule of evidence or case law." Id. at 69.
118. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
119. California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 155. The United States Supreme Court
determined that the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence did not violate the constitutional right to confrontation. 399 U.S. at 167-
68. The Court reasoned that the right of confrontation was satisfied if the witness
was present in the courtroom and appeared on the witness stand, under oath and
subject to cross-examination, with the jury having an opportunity at that time to
observe his demeanor. Id. at 158.
120. Commonwealth v. Thirkield, 502 Pa. 542, 467 A.2d 323 (McDermott,
J., dissenting).
121. Thirkfield, 467 A.2d at 324. "Indeed, the cross-examination to which a
recanting witness is subjected will likely be meaningful and vigorous since the witness
is already 'on the spot' in having to explain the discrepancies between earlier
statements and direct testimony, or deny that the earlier statements were made at
all." Brady, 507 A.2d at 69.
122. Id. See e.g., State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939). The
orthodox position can be best exemplified by the opinion of Judge Stone in the
Minnesota-Suprerfe Court case of State v. Saporen. In Saporen, the defendant was
convicted of carnal knowledge and abusing a female child under the age of eighteen.
The trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce prior inconsistent statements of
a witness as substantive evidence. 285 N.W. at 899-900. In reversing the trial court's
decision, Judge Stone held that "[t]he chief merit of cross-examination is not that
at some future time it gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony.
Its principal virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process. Its strokes
fall while the iron is hot." Id. at 901. "False testimony is apt to harden and become
unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has opportunity for
reconsideration and influence by the suggestion of others, whose interests may be,
and often is, to maintain falsehood rather than truth." Id.
123. California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 159.
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the discrepancies between his prior statement and direct testimony. 12A
In rejecting the orthodox position, Judge Learned Hand declared:
The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the earlier
statements in preference to those made upon the stand is indeed real,
but we find no difficulty in it. If, from all that the jury sees of the
witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but
what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they
see and hear of that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity
that the case must be decided only in accordance with the truth of
words uttered under oath in court. 125
Two final arguments have arisen in opposition to the orthodox
position. The first is that there is no guarantee that a limiting
instruction will assure that the jury will consider the evidence solely
as a means to impeach the witness' credibility, and not as substantive
evidence. 126 The second argument is that a prior inconsistent state-
ment, "because of its greater relative proximity in time to the event
in question,. . . is inherently more reliable.' 
127
"The foregoing criticisms ... have eroded the foundations of the
orthodox view prohibiting the use of prior inconsistent statements of
a non-party witness as substantive evidence, and have persuaded a
growing number of jurisdictions to discard the outmoded rule"'' 28 in
favor of the modem rule. The dissent in Brady seems to be of the
opinion that the court has taken a long step backwards by its
decision. 29 When viewed in a historical context, however, it seems
124. Brady, 507 A.2d at 69. "The trier of fact may bring to bear his or her
sensory observations, experience, common sense and logic upon the witness to assess
credibility and to determine the truth and accuracy of both the out-of-court decla-
rations and the in-court testimony." Id.
125. DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied,
268 U.S. 706 (1925).
126. Reutlinger, supra at 367. As a practical matter, it is hard to conceive of
the situation in which a jury would be able to draw such fine lines. If the jury
considers the statement in court false and the extrajudicial statement true, it is
expecting a good deal of jurors not experienced in such fine distinctions simply to
reject all of the evidence. Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Congress Takes
a Compromising Step Backward in Enacting Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 8 Loy. Chi. L.J.
251, 266 (1977).
127. Reutlinger, supra at 368. "[N]ot only is the witness' recollection more
accurate at a time closer to the event in question, but there has been less of an
opportunity at that time for improper influence to have encouraged the witness to
falsify his story. Id. at 368. "The greater the lapse of time between the event and
the trial, the greater chance of exposure of the witness to each" of a number of
adverse influences, including "distorted memory, corruption, false suggestion, intim-
idation or appeal to sympathy." McCormick, supra at 578.
128. Brady, 507 A.2d at 69.
129. Brady, 507 A.2d at 73 (Flaherty, J., dissenting, joined by Zappala, J.).
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clear that Pennsylvania has finally realized that the orthodox position
has become outdated and no longer serves any necessary or useful
purpose.
Joanna K. Budde
